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THEGREAT CRASH ANDThEONSET OF ThE GREAT DEPRESSION
ABSTRACT
Thispaper argues that the collapse of stock prices in October 1929
generated temporary uncertainty about future income which caused consumers
to forego purchases of durable and semidurable goods in late 1929 and much
of 1930. Evidence that the stock market crash generated uncertainty is
provided by the decline in confidence expressed by contemporary
forecasters. Evidence that this uncertainty affected consumer behavior is
provided by the fact that spending on consumer durables and semidurables
declined immediately following the Great Crash and by the fact that there
is a negative historical relationship between stock market variability and




Berkeley, CA 94720"Uncertainty is worse than knowing the truth, no matter how bad."
(The Mamazine of Wall Street, November 30, 1929, p. 177)
INTRODUCTION
In the mind of the average person the Great Crash and the Great
Depression are often considered to be the same event. The decline in stock
prices in October 1929 and the tremendous decline in real output between
1929 and 1933 are often thought of as part of the same cataclysmic decline
of the American economy. In contrast, in the minds of many economists the
two events are not only not synonymous, they are in fact only tangentially
related. Dornbusch and Fischer (1984), for example, stress that real
output started down before stock prices collapsed and that the largest
falls in output did not occur until after the banking panics of 1931.
Despite the dichotomy that economists often impose between the Great
Crash and the Great Depression, it is nevertheless true that the downturn
in real output that began in August 1929 accelerated dramatically after the
collapse of stock prices. For example, while seasonally adjusted
industrial production declined 1.8 percent between August 1929 and October
1929, it declined 9.8 percent between October 1929 and December 1929 and
another 23.9 percent between December 1929 and December 1930. Furthermore,
while economists have reasonably convincing stories about why output
started to decline in the summer of 1929 and why it took a dramatic fall in
1931, the existing explanations for why the decline accelerated so
decidedly in late 1929 and continued throughout 1930 are much less
satisfactory.2
This paper argues that there may in fact be a very important link
between the stock market crash and the decline in real output in late 1929
and through much of 1930. That link is that the stock market crash caused
consumers and producers to become uncertain about the course of future
income. As a result, consumers and producers chose to delay current
spending on durable and semidurable goods as they waited for further
information about the likely course of economic activity. This decline itt
spending then drove down aggregate income through a standard Keynesian
mechanism (or, conceivably, through effects on the real interest rate and
the supply of labor).
The fact that an increase in particular types of uncertainty can
theoretically cause an immediate drop in investment spending is discussed
in detail in Bernanke (l983a). In Section I of the paper I extend
Bernanke's analysis of the determinants of investment spending to the
effects of uncertainty on consumer spending. I present a simple infinite
horizon model of consumer behavior when there are durable and nondurable
goods and when future income is temporarily uncertain. This model of
consumer behavior shows that temporary uncertainty about future income can
cause a pause in the purchases of durable consumption goods. I also
discuss the predictions of the model when there are durable goods with
varying degrees of resalability.I argue that goods for which purchases
can be more easily reversed will be less affected by temporary uncertainty
than those that are irreversible. I then provide reasons why one might
expect a stock crash to generate temporary uncertainty about future income.
Section II of the paper examines the behavior of various disaggregate
spending and production series to see if it is consistent with the model
discussed in Section I. The model predicts that all types of spending on3
durables and semidurables should decline drastically following the Great
Crash, and that consumer spending on durables with difficult resale should
decline most of all. Using various types of monthly spending data I find
that sales of durables did indeed decline markedly relative to usual
following the collapse of stock prices. Using annual data on the
production of various types of consumption and investment goods. I also
find that consumer spending on durable goods with poor resale potential
(such as china, floor coverings, and household furniture) declined much
more than one would otherwise predict, even controlling for the behavior of
total output.
In addition to making predictions about the behavior of various
spending series in 1929 and 1930, the uncertainty hypothesis also predicts
that there should be a negative historical relationship between stock
market variability and real consumer spending on durable goods. Using data
on the annual production of various types of consumer goods, I find that
there is indeed a negative relationship between consumer spending on
durables and stock market volatility in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. Furthermore, I find that the negative effect of stock market
variability is strong enough to account for much of the decline in real
consumer spending that occurred in late 1929 and 1930.
While the behavior of sales and production is consistent with the
uncertainty hypothesis, it is also important to find direct evidence on
whether uncertainty increased dramatically because of the stock market
crash in late 1929. In Section III I do this by examining the forecasts
and analyses of five contemporary forecasters for the periods surrounding
the recessions of 1921, 1924, and the stock market crash of 1929. This
previously unexploited source provides a wealth of information about the4
expectations and uncertainty of sophisticated financial analysts in these
crucial periods and about their perception of consumer expectations and
uncertainty.I find that forecasters were themselves much more uncertain
following the stock market crash than was typical even for unsettled times,
and more importantly, that forecasters believed that consumers and
producers were unusually uncertain about the future of the economy
immediately following the drastic fall in stock prices and continuing well
into 1930.
This explanation for the decline in consumption in late 1929 and early
1930 may provide an important missing link in the economic history of the
Great Depression, As mentioned earlier, economists have widely accepted
explanations for many of the pieces of the decline in output between 1929
and 1933. Hamilton (1987) argues convincingly that monetary stringency was
an important source of the initial decline in production in the late summer
of 1929. FrIedman and Schwartz (1963) have provided evidence that the
decline in the money supply caused by the banking panics of mid-1931
depressed the economy beginning in 1931. Furthermore, Bernanke (1983b)
suggests that the collapse of intermediation caused by the banking panics
of 1931 provides another source of decline for the later years of the
Depression.
The primary mystery surrounding the Great Depression is why output
fell so drastically in late 1929 and all of 1930. Temin (1976) argues that
the behavior of interest rates suggests that monetary stringency could not
be the main explanation for the real decline in this period. Temin's
alternative explanation is that there was a decline in spending of all
sorts, and of consumption in particular. This view is fairly widely
accepted (see, for example, Hamilton (1987, p. 168) and Gordon and WilcoxS
(1982, pp. 70-74), though some authors such as Mayer (1978a, b) have
challenged Temin's evidence on the importance of consumption.
Several studies have tried to explain the decline in spending noted by
Temin. Not surprisingly, many of these explanations are related to the
effects of the stock crash. Temin (1976), for example, asks whether
negative expectations caused by the crash could have decreased consumers
purchases. He concludes from the behavior of bond ratings that
expectations were too optimistic for this to be an explanation. Mishkin
(1978) asks whether the change in the household balance sheet caused by the
fall of security prices can explain the fall in consumption. While his
estimates suggest that the decline in wealth and the desire for liquidity
can explain some of the decline in spending, they cannot account for a
substantial fraction of the total fall. The failure of these explanations
to account for the large fall in real spending following the Great Crash
suggests that the uncertainty hypothesis could provide a useful step in
explaining the mysterious first year of the Great Depression.
I. MODEL OF THE EFFECT OF TEMPORARY UNCERTAINTY
Sasic Model
To evaluate how temporary uncertainty about future income affects
current consumption spending, it is useful to consider a simple model of
consumer decision making. The model that I present assumes that there is a
representative consumer who is infinitely lived, has quadratic utility, and
allocates his consumption between perishable and durable goods. The prices
of both durable and perishable goods are assumed to be fixed. The model
shows that a temporary increase in uncertainty depresses consumer spending.6
In essence, the model shows that the aggregate demand curve for the economy
shifts back in response to a temporary rise in uncertainty about future
income.
Definitions. The basic setup of the model is as follows. There is
one perishable good in the economy (food) and x is the quantity of the
perishable that the consumer purchases in period t.The price of the
perishable is one. There is also one durable good in the economy (a car)
which lasts for N periods and then depreciates completely. The consumer
chooses which is the quality of the single durable that he owns in
period t. The price of the durable in the period that the consumer buys it
is aq. Because there is no depreciation until the Nth period, a durable
of quality q provides q services in each of N periods. Purchases of
durables are assumed to be irreversible.
Utility is assumed to be quadratic in the two types of goods. That
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The consumer is assumed to live forever, so lifetime utility, U, is
(2) U —
tO[)U
where 5 is the discount rate. Lifetime wealth, W, is equal to the present
discounted value of future income, Y. Temporary uncertainty is introduced
into the model by assuming that in period 0 lifetime wealth is unknown,
with mean p and variance a2. In period 1 the certain value of lifetime
wealth is learned. Thus, the consumer is temporarily uncertain in period 0
and the degree of uncertainty is indicated by a2.
The basic setup of the model should make clear that the mechanism by
which uncertainty affects consumer spending in this model is different from7
that in Zeldes (1986) and others, where the third derivative of the utility
function is key. Because the third derivative of a quadratic utility
function is obviously zero, the effects of uncertainty in this model will
have to come from the irreversibility of durable purchases and the
temporary nature of the uncertainty.
To make the model fore tractable I make several simplifying
assumptions. First, I assume that the interest rate (r) is constant and
equal to the discount rate (6). Second, I assume that the coefficients a
and b of the utility function are equal. I also assume that the price (per
unit of quality) of the durable good is
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These assumptions ensure that under certainty the quantity of the
nondurablethat the consumer buys (xe) and the service flow of the durable
that the consumer owns ()willbe constant and equal to one another.
Analysis. To analyze how an increase in uncertainty in period 0
affects a consumer's spending decision I calculate the expected lifetime
utility of the representative consumer both under the assumption that he
does not buy a durable in period 0 and under the assumption that he does
buy a durable in period 0. I then see how the difference between these two
expected utilities is affected by an increase in the variance of the
present discounted value of lifetime income, Because utility is
quadratic, calculating the expected lifetime utilities under the two
scenarios is straightforward.







where x1 and q1 are the level of consumption of nondurables and durable
services in each period starting in period 1. Expected lifetime utility if
the consumer does not buy a durable in period 0 (UD,t) is:
ar 2 a 2
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where V0 is the utility that the consumer receives from a fully depreciated
durable or if he does not own any durable at all.1
If the consumer 4buya durable in period 0, before the value of
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where is the quality of the durable that the consumer buys in period N,
and every N periods in the future. The expressions for x0 given in
equations (4) and (7) show that spending on nondurables will be higher if
the consumer is foregoing the purchase of a durable than if he were
consuming both nondurables and a durable in period 0. Expected utility if
the consumer does buy a durable in period 0 (UD) is:
(9) UD -- {a+ faa) [J2
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Using the expressions for UDOfl,t and UDO and grouping terms in s and
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Ifthis difference is positive, the consumer delays purchasing a durable
until period 1 when the level of lifetime wealth is revealed. If it is
negative, the consumer does not delay the purchase.
From (10) it is easy to see that the derivative of AU with respect to
is positive: an increase in uncertainty about future income tends to
move AU in the direction of being positive. Thus, it makes it more likely
that the consumer will find it advantageous to delay purchasing the durable
until the uncertainty is resolved in period 1.
As the model is written, it is equally costly for all consumers to
forego the purchase of a durable in any given period. As a result, if the
rise in uncertainty is large enough to cause anyone to not buy a durable in
period 0, it causes everyone to not buy a durable. Thus, the model
predicts that spending on durables, if anything, stops completely in
response to a rise in uncertainty. This implausible result can be
eliminated by assuming that the cost of foregoing purchasing a durable
varies across consumers. For example, foregoing purchasing a new car is
more costly for an individual whose fully depreciated car needs expensive
repairs in order to run another year than for an individual whose old car
is still running smoothly. In the context of the model above, this simple
heterogeneity can be incorporated by assuming that V0, the utility one
receives from a completely depreciated durable good or from no durable at
all, varies across consumers. When this heterogeneity is introduced,10
aggregate spending on durables falls but does not go to zero in response to
temporary uncertainty.
Extensions of the Basic Model
While the simple model above is adequate to show that a temporary rise
in uncertainty leads to a drop in consumer spending on durables, there are
some extensions that make the model both more complete and more realistic.
One useful extension concerns the possibility of resale. The simple model
above assumes that once a consumer purchases a good, he is stuck with it
until it wears out. However, it is more realistic to suppose that there is
an active resale market for some goods. To make resale possible in the
model above, one needs to introduce some heterogeneity of income across
consumers. With this heterogeneity, there is a market for used goods
regardless of the realization of future income because consumers with
different income levels purchase goods that turn out to be inappropriate
for the original buyers.2 For example, if an individual buys a car of
moderate quality and then finds out that income is lower than predicted, he
can sell the car to a wealthier person who wishes to buy that level of
quality.
If there were a perfect resale market for every durable good, then all
durables would be just like nondurables and a temporary uncertainty would
have no effect on spending on durables. However, we suspect that resale
markets for most durables are far from perfect, so temporary uncertainty
can cause a decline in aggregate spending on durables. Furthermore, the
resale markets for some durables are much better than for others.4 As a
result, the purchases of goods for which resale is easy will behave much
more like nondurables than will the purchases of goods for which resale is11
difficult. In this case, purchases of goods for which resale is easy would
decline less in response to a rise in uncertainty than purchases of goods
for which resale is very difficult.
A second extension concerns the life span of the durable good. In the
model above, there is just one durable good and it lasts for N periods
before it depreciates completely. In fact, however, goods differ in
longevity. In particular, there exists a class of goods, traditionally
called semidurables, that last decidedly longer than perishables such as
food and fuel, but less long than durable goods such as stoves and cars.
Goods in this category include shoes, clothing, household linens, and
automobile tires. The effect of temporary uncertainty on purchases of
these goods depends on the relative importance of two competing factors.
On the one hand, the resale potential of such semidurable goods is
particularly poor. There is very little market for used shoes and clothes.
The previous discussion suggests that this inability to resell will make
semidurable goods very susceptible to the negative effects of temporary
uncertainty. On the other hand, the purchase/do not purchase condition of
the basic model given in (10) shows that making N smaller (that is,
shortening the life span of the durable) makes the derivative of Liii with
respect to a2 smaller. The intuition behind this result is that the cost
of delaying the purchase of new semidurables is similar to that of delaying
the purchase of durables, but the period over which one reaps the benefit
of waiting (consuming the optimal amount of semidurable services given the
realization of income) is shorter. As a result, there is a tendency for
semidurable purchases to decline less in response to uncertainty than
durable purchases.
While it is not obvious which of these two tendencies is stronger, it12
seems likely that the lack of resale might be severe enough for uncertainty
to have a strong depressing effect on sales of semidurables. This is
especially likely to be the case if the life span of semidurables is fairly
long and the temporary uncertainty is expected to be resolved quickly.
...orary Uncertainty on Investment
The model and extensions discussed above examine the effects of
uncertainty about future income on consumption. It is useful to examine
how this uncertainty might also affect investment. As mentioned above,
Bernanke (1983a) provides a model of the effect of temporary uncertainty on
investment spending. He shows that when there are various projects with
different payoffs under different States of the world, increased
uncertainty about the future state of the world can lead to a pause in
investment as investors wait to gather more information.
Bernanke applies his model to the effect of an oil cartel on
investment in technologies that can either be oil-intensive or oil-saving.
However it is possible that there are situations where the level of future
income could also be an important determinant of the relative payoff of
various projects. For example, suppose there are increasing returns to
scale in the technology for producing some good. In this case, if one
expects demand to be high in the future, one would invest in a large plant;
if one expects demand to be low in the future, one would invest in a
smaller, less efficient plant. If uncertainty regarding future aggregate
income rises temporarily, one might forego all investment spending for a
while and wait for the uncertainty to be resolved.
This example shows that temporary uncertainty about future income
could have a depressing effect on investment spending. At the same time,13
however, the specificity of the example suggests that the conditions under
which income uncertainty affects investment may be limited. Whereas
temporary uncertainty about future income is likely to have a pervasive
effect on consumers, only some investors are likely to be have projects
whose relative payoff is dependent on the realization of future income. As
a result, it is likely that temporary uncertainty about the future state of
the economy has a substantially larger negative effect on consumers than on
producers.
ADolication of the Model to 1929-30
While the model and extensions discussed above show that temporary
uncertainty can cause a drop in spending, there remains the question of how
and why the stock market crash of October 1929 might have generated
widespread temporary uncertainty about future income. The most
straightforward story about the rise in uncertainty in November 1929 starts
from the presumption that the stock market experienced a speculative bubble
that burst in October 1929. This presumption is supported by a wide
variety of contemporary and modern economic analysts.5 Under this
assumption, the drastic decline in stock prices is an exogenous event
because the bursting of a bubble is typically related to arbitrary events,
not to changes in fundamentals.
This exogenous event may have caused uncertainty about future income
for a variety of reasons. One scenario that fits with many contemporary
accounts is that people realized that this exogenous crash could disrupt
credit markets and reduce investment. At the same time, they were hopeful
that the government would step in and stabilize or stimulate the economy.
These contradictory possibilities following the Great Crash made people14
much more uncertain about what future income would be than they were before
the crash.
It is also possible to argue that the stock crash generated
uncertainty without assuming that the collapse of stock prices in 1929 was
necessarily the result of the bursting of a speculative bubble. It is
possible that stock market was thought to be an imperfect predictor of the
real economy by agents in the prewar economy. In this case, standard
linear prediction theory indicates that a larger than usual movement in
stock prices is likely to be associated with greater uncertainty about
one's prediction of future income. Thus, even if the decline in stock
prices was not an exogenous event, it could have caused a temporary rise in
uncertainty if individuals were using it to forecast the real economy.6
Both of these stories explain why uncertainty may have risen
dramatically following the Great Crash. However, in order for the model
given above to predict that real consumption spending will actually
decrease in this situation, the assumption that prices are constant must
also hold. While this is not literally the case in 1929 and 1930, prices
of consumer goods move surprisingly little in the months immediately
following the Great Crash. For example, the aggregate consumer price index
(CPI-W, 1957-59 —100)fell less than 1 percent between October and
December 1929 and less than 2 percent between January and June 1930. This
suggests that the basic preconditions necessary for the simple model given
above to apply to the first year of the Great Depression are indeed met.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In this section I examine the behavior of several sales and production15
series to see if it is consistent with the view that the stock market crash
of October 1929 depressed the real economy by causing consumers and
investors to become temporarily uncertain.
Empirical Predictions of the Uncertainty Hypothesis
The model and extensions of the uncertainty hypothesis presented in
Section I make several predictions about the behavior of various economic
variables around the time of the Great Crash. The simplest of these is
that spending on durable goods should have declined soon after the rise in
uncertainty in October l929. Furthermore, if the rise in uncertainty
following the Great Crash was very large, then the drop in spending should
also have been very large.
This prediction need not be unique to the uncertainty hypothesis.
Models that assume that consumption is driven only by income and wealth
might also predict a large fall in spending in late 1929 and 1930, provided
that wealth declined a sufficient amount. Similarly, models that assume
that current spending is affected by expectations of future income might
predict that spending would drop in late 1929 if consumers became convinced
that a severe drop in income were imminent. However, as the survey of the
literature in the introduction suggests, the fall in wealth and the
forecasts of future income were such in 1929 that one would not have
predicted a large fall in spending following the Great Crash. Thus, the
prediction that spending should fall substantially in November 1929 is an
important identifying characteristic of the uncertainty hypothesis.
More unique predictions of the uncertainty hypothesis concern the
composition of any decline in spending or output that occurred following
the Great Crash. First, the model of consumer behavior in Section I16
indicates that while sales of durable goods should fall in response to a
rise in uncertainty, sales of noridurables should in fact rise in the same
situation. This prediction differs from the predictions of models of
consumer behavior that stress the importance of wealth, income, or future
income. These models typically predict that spending on both durables and
nondurables will decline in response to a decline in actual or expected
income or wealth, though spending on durables will decline more (because a
larger movement in durables purchases is needed to yield a given change in
the flow of consumption services).
A second important prediction of the uncertainty hypothesis about
composition concerns which type of durables purchases will be most
affected. The discussion of resale in Section I suggests that durable
goods for which resale is difficult should experience a larger drop in
sales relative to usual than goods for which resale is easy. This
prediction is different from that of models of consumer behavior that
stress the importance of income or wealth. These models typically do not
predict that durables with poor resale potential should fall more than
others.
A third prediction involves the behavior of semidurable goods. As
discussed in Section I, semidurable goods typically have very poor resale
potential. Thus, provided that their shorter life span does not reverse
the effects of this inability to resell, one would expect sales of
semidurables to be particularly negatively affected by a rise in
uncertainty.
A fourth prediction concerning the composition of spending is that
the rise in uncertainty following the Great Crash should have had a
relatively larger effect on consumers than producers. This suggests that17
sales of consumer durables should fall more relative to usual than sales of
producer durables. This prediction differs from that of traditional models
of economic fluctuations which postulate that investment spending is more
susceptible to exogenous shocks and hence may tend to have more extreme
fluctuations than consumption.
In addition to these predictions about the decline and the changes in
the composition of spending immediately following the Great Crash, the
uncertainty hypothesis also makes a unique prediction about the historical
relationship between consumer spending and stock market variability.
Provided that uncertainty about future income is a stable, positive
function of stock market variability, it should be the case that consumer
spending on durable goods and stock market variability are inversely
related over long periods of time. This prediction is clearly one that is
different from more conventional models which predict that the level of the
stock market rather than the variability of stock prices should be
positively related to consumption.
Decline in Spending
Data bearing on the simplest prediction of the uncertainty hypothesis
-thatspending on durable goods should have declined in November 1929 -
areplentiful. A variety of sources provide monthly data on sales of
different types of products for the period around the Great Crash.
The best known of the retail sales series is the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB) index of department store sales. (For the exact source of this and
all the other monthly spending series, see the notes to Table I.) This
series begins in 1919 and accounts for approximately ten percent of total
retail sales in the United States in the late 1920s.8 Department stores18
carry some consumer goods that last many years, such as furniture, floor
coverings, luggage, and china, and some consumer goods that last only a few
years, such as clothing, shoes, and linens. As a result, this sales series
clearly covers a mixture of consumer durable and semidurable goods.
Another sales series that is available and covers similar goods is one
showing the total value of sales from the two largest mail-order houses of
this period, Montgomery Ward and Sears.
There are two other series that show monthly spending on durable
goods. One is a series on new automobile registrations that is available
for the period after 1925. This series appears to provide a good measure
of automobile sales. The second is a series on new construction contracts
awarded in a given month. This series shows the square footage of
buildings put under contract to be built within the next 60 days. Hence,
it provides a rough measure of spending on new construction. Because the
construction contract data are divided into residential and nonresidential
building, they can be used to analyze whether consumer spending on new
construction differed from commercial spending.
There are also two retail sales series that show the behavior of sales
of nondurable goods. One is the value of sales of the four major five-and-
ten-cent store chains. The other is the FRB index of the sales of grocery
store chains. The FRBgrocerystore series only exists through December
1929. Since the FRE discontinued it because it felt that the index was no
longer representative of national grocery store sales, the quality of this
series in the late 1920s is clearly somewhat suspect. Despite this flaw,
it is useful to have these series on sales of nondurables to compare to the
series on spending on durable goods.
I deflate the series for department Store sales, mail-order sales, and19
ten-cent store sales by the aggregate seasonally unadjusted consumer price
index (CPI). I deflate the series for grocery store sales by the
seasonally unadjusted CPI for food. Because the series on car
registrations and construction contracts awarded are already in real terms,
no deflation of these series is necessary.
For each monthly ending series I then estimate an equation of form:
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where is the monthly percentage change in series i, d, is a dummy
variable for the kth month, and t is a linear time trend. The monthly
dummy variables are included to account for seasonal movements, the own
lags to account for serial correlation (arising, for example, from sector-
specific shocks) and the linear trend to take into account the possibility
that the growth rate of spending may have an upward trend.
This regression is run over the period 1919:1-1928:12 for all the
spending series except automobile registrations, for which data do not
become available until 1925:1. Thus, this regression summarizes the usual
behavior of spending in the l920s. I then do a static forecast of each
series for late 1929 and early 1930 using the coefficients estimated
through 1928. The difference between the forecasted monthly values and the
actual percentage changes in spending provides a measure of whether the
behavior of spending was aberrant following the Great Crash. The use of a
static forecast ensures that a given forecast error reflects the new
residual for each month, not the cumulative effect of previous forecast
errors.
The estimated forecast errors for September 1929 through March 1930
for each monthly spending series are given in Table 1. The standard error20
of each regression for 1919-1928 is also given so that one has a basis for
gauging whether the forecast errorsare large relative to the predictive
power of the regression.
The main result is that for the series corresponding to consumer
spending on durable and semidurable goods, namely department store sales,
mail-order sales, new car registrations, and residential construction
contracts, there does appear to be a large forecast error in November 1929.
For department store sales the forecast error in November 1929 is almost
twice the size of the standard error of the regression; for automobile
registrations it is one-and-a-half times the standard error; and for mail-
order sales and residential construction contracts it is the same size as
the standard error. That the forecast error is large and negative in
November indicates that the actual percentage change in all of these
categories of spending between October and November 1929 was much smaller
than one would have predicted given the usual behavior of sales in the
l920s. This is exactly what the uncertainty hypothesis predicts should be
the result of dramatic rise in uncertainty following the stock market
crash.
For these same four series there is also a substantial forecast error
in October 1929. This finding is consistent with the uncertainty
hypothesis because the uncertainty related to the decline in stock prices
may well have begun with the first large drop in stock prices on Black
Thursday, October 24, 1929. If spending dropped precipitously in the last
seven days of October, this would be enough to cause a moderate forecast
error in sales in this month. At the same time, because part of October
should have experienced normal sales, it still makes sense that there
should be another, larger error in November.921
After the large negative forecast errors in October and November 1929,
all four of these series on sales of durables show smaller errors, some
positive and some negative, in December. This behavior is also roughly
consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis. In its simplest form, the
uncertainty hypothesis predicts a one-time drop in spending following the
Great Crash; after tht drop, it predicts that spending would stay low
until the uncertainty is resolved. Thus, one would not expect to see
further important negative forecast errors in December.
One potential problem with this analysis is that large forecast errors
return in January and several other months in 1930. However, as I describe
in the next section, it appears that the further stock price declines and
the confusion caused by the government's attempts to deal with the Crest
Crash generated additional surges in uncertainty during much of 1930. If
this argument is correct, then the large declines in spending on durables
in 1930 relative to what one would predict from their past behavior is
consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis.
Chanses in Comoosition
There are three predictions concerning the composition of spending
after the Great Crash that apply to the uncertainty hypothesis but not to
more standard models of consumer and producer behavior. These unique
predictions are that spending on nondurables should have risen while
spending on durables should have fallen relative to usual, that spending on
durable goods with poor resale potential (including seinidurable goods)
should have fallen more relative to usual than spending on goods with easy
resale, and that spending on consumer durables should have fallen more
relative to usual than spending on producer durables.22
gehavior of Spendina. The size and sign of the forecast errors from
the prediction equations for the various monthly spending series given in
Table 1 can provide some evidence on the presence of the composition
effects predicted by the uncertainty hypothesis. First, in addition to
showing the forecast errors for the series on spending on durable goods,
Table 1 also shows the forecast errors for series covering the spending on
some nondurable goods. From Table 1 it is clear that while spending on
durables declines a great deal relative to usual following the Great Crash,
spending on nondurables does not show the same pattern. Tan-cent stores
show large negative forecast errors in September and October, but
essentially no error in November. Grocery store sales also show a large
negative error in September, but a positive forecast error in October and
only a very small negative error in November, The fact that there is not a
large negative forecast error in November 1929 in either of these series is
broadly consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis, which would predict
that the fall in sales should be limited to durable goods.1°
Second, the behavior of construction contracts provides evidence that
spending on consumer durables was more affected by the Great Crash than
spending on producer durables. The prediction equation for residential
construction contracts has large negative forecast errors in October and
November of 1929. The prediction equation for commercial and industrial
construction contracts has a large negative forecast error in September
1929 and a small negative error in October 1929, but then actually has a
positive error in November 1929. This difference in the behavior of
residential and nonresidential construction contracts is consistent with
the uncertainty hypothesis which predicts that consumers will contract
their spending more than producers in response to a temporary rise in23
uncertainty about future income.
While this analysis of the behavior of monthly spending data suggests
that the composition effects predicted by the uncertainty hypothesis may be
present, the available data are not completely adequate for testing these
predictions. Because we do not possess monthly data on total spending, it
is impossible to discuss the behavior of spending on different categories
of goods controlling for the overall movement in spending.
Behavior of Commodity Output. This limitation can be overcome
somewhat by examining annual data on the real output of commodities
destined for domestic consumers and producers. The Shaw (1947) series on
commodity output for 1889-1933 provides good estimates of the output of
approximately 40 different classes of consumer and producer goods.11
Because Shaw provides a measure of the total production of commodities as
well as the many disaggregate output series, it is possible to see how the
production of particular kinds of producer and consumer goods typically
moves with total production in the late 1800s and early l900s. Then one
can examine whether the production of certain types of goods is aberrant in
1929 and 1930 in the ways predicted by the uncertainty hypothesis.
To see if the production of certain goods behaved aberrantly, I
perform the following test. Over the period 1889-1928 I regress the
percentage change in a given category of commodity output on one own lag,
the current percentage change in total output, one lag of the percentage
change in total output, and a constant.'2 That is, I run
(12) y —+ fly1+ +
wherey denotes the percentage change in the production of a category of
goods and y denotes the percentage change in the total production of
commodities. This regression should both capture the usual relationship24
between, say, the production of cars and total production, and allow for
category specific shocks that may have some persistence.
I then forecast the production of each category of commodity output in
1929 and 1930, taking as exogenous the actual movement in total production
in these years and the past movements in all types of production. The
difference between the actual percentage change in production in 1929 and
1930 and the predicted value is a measure of whether the production of a
particular good is unusual in these two years. These resulting forecast
errors for each category of goods as well as the standard error of the
corresponding regression are given in Table 2.
Before one can say whether the pattern of forecast errors is
consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis, one must deal with the question
of whether production data can be taken to represent consumption and
investment spending in the years surrounding the Great Crash. Because the
Shaw production series is already adjusted to take into account net
exports, the only question is whether inventory behavior is aberrant in
1929 and 1930. In the regression above, if inventory investment hassome
typical cyclical pattern which continues into 1929 and 1930, then a
forecast error in a production equation also represents a forecast error in
spending. However, if inventory investment deviates from its usual
cyclical pattern in 1929 and 1930, then the forecast errors in production
could either over- or understate the true forecast errors in spending.
Actual data on inventories for the period 1889-1930 which could
resolve this ambiguity are sparse. However, the classic study by
Abramovitz concludes that in the interwar era total inventory investment
tended to be procyclical as it is today (Abramovjtz, 1950, p. 345). At the
same time, Abramovitzs data on total real inventories as of December 31st25
show a definite rise in inventories in both 1929 and 1930. Since total
output declined substantially in 1930, this fact suggests that more
production than usual went into inventories in this year. This indicates
that a given forecast error in production will actually translate into a
larger forecast error in consumption or investment. Thus, the behavior of
the Shaw production se..ies can be taken to represent a lower bound on the
size of the negative forecast errors in the various categories of
consumption and investment.13
An additional problem in interpreting the results stems from the fact
that the Shaw production data are annual. If the uncertainty hypothesis is
correct, then 1929 should have been a normal year until October, and then
spending on certain types of goods should have fallen greatly in the last
two months. As a result, this drop is likely to cause only a small
negative forecast error in 1929. On the other hand, provided that the
uncertainty is not resolved rapidly and that much of the drop in spending
actually is felt in 1930, the forecast error in 1930 should be large for
particular commodities.
Having dealt with these complications, one can see that the sign and
significance of the various forecast errors given in Table 2 are remarkably
consistent with composition effects predicted by the uncertainty
hypothesis. First, the forecast errors for nearly all categories of
consumer durables and semidurables, as well as for the corresponding
aggregates, are negative in both 1929 and 1930. They are also often quite
large relative to the standard error of the corresponding regression in
1930. This indicates that consumer spending on durables and semidurables
was lower in both 1929 and especially 1930 than one would have predicted
given the size of the movement in total output. This behavior is certainty26
consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis and echoes that of the sales
data discussed above.14
Second, the forecast errors for perishable consumer goods such as
food, drugs, and fuel are typically positive in both 1929 and 1930, though
the errors are never large relative to the standard error of the
corresponding prediction regression. The positive forecast errors indicate
that production (and as argued above, consumption) of these goods was
higher than one would have predicted given the total fall in output. This
finding is consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis.
Third, the size of the negative forecast errors for different types of
consumer durables also confirms (though somewhat unevenly) the composition
predictions of the uncertainty hypothesis when there are differing degrees
of ease of resale. Among the consumer durables for which the forecast
error in 1930 is particularly large relative to the corresponding standard
error are floor coverings and luggage. Among the goods for which the error
is very small or even positive are musical instruments and pleasure craft
(boats). If one believes, as seems reasonable, that musical instruments
and boats are quite easy to resell, while floor coverings and luggage are
very hard to resell, this difference in behavior appears to be consistent
with the notion that the easier it is to resell a good, the less purchases
of that good are affected by uncertainty. This prediction is also
confirmed by the fact that household furniture and china, both goods with
poor resale potential, have forecast errors that are at least as large as
the standard error of the corresponding regression. It is, however,
contradicted somewhat by the behavior of jewelry and automobiles which also
show a moderately large negative error, despite the fact that resale of
these goods should be quite easy. Thus, while there is some evidence that27
the composition of the fall in consumption of durables is consistent with
the uncertainty hypothesis, the evidence is not unambiguous.
The behavior of semidurable goods confirms the composition predictions
of the uncertainty hypothesis more strongly. Semidurables as a whole have
a negative forecast error in 1929 that is approximately equal to the
standard error of the forecasting equation and a negative forecast error in
1930 that is almost twice the standard error. This is exactly what one
would predict from the uncertainty hypothesis because goods such as shoes,
clothes and house furnishing tend to have a very limited resale market.
Fourth, the forecast errors for the production of most producer
durable goods are positive in both 1929 and 1930. In some cases, such as
for aggregate producer durables, the positive forecast error is one to two
times the standard error of the corresponding forecasting regression. The
fact that the errors for producer durables are typically positive does not
mean that investment spending did not fall in 1930; in fact, aggregate
production of producer durables fell 22 percent between 1929 and 1930.
Rather, it indicates that investment spending fell less than one would have
expected given the large fall in total output. This change in the
composition of the fall in output is exactly what one would have expected
if uncertainty related to the stock market crash had a larger effect on
consumers than producers.
Historical Relationship
The uncertainty hypothesis predicts that in general there should be an
inverse relationship between consumer spending on durable goods and
uncertainty about future income. If uncertainty is a continuous, positive
function of stock market volatility, this prediction means that stock28
market variability and consumer spending on durables and semidurables
should be negatively related over long periods of time.
To see if this is the case, I expand the simple forecasting equation
for different classes of commodity output given in equation (12) to include
a measure of stock market variability.I run
(13) + + + 72i't-l+
where and y are the percentage change in a class of commodity output
and total commodity output, respectively, and v is the annual average of
the squared monthly change in the value of the stock market. As before,
this equation is estimated only through 1928 so that the dramatic events of
1929 and 1930 cannot influence the results.
The resulting parameter estimates for equation (13) for four major
classes of commodity output are given in Table 3. For the output of
consumer durables and semidurables, the estimated coefficient on Vis
large and negative. This indicates that both large positive and large
negative movements in stock prices tend to depress the consumption and
production of consumer durable goods just as the uncertainty hypothesis
predicts. For consumer perishables the coefficient is large and positive.
This is again consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis which predicts
that consumers will substitute perishable goods for durable goods in
periods of great uncertainty. Thus, for all three types of consumer goods
the coefficient has the sign predicted by the uncertainty hypothesis.
However, the large standard errors suggest that the relationships are not
measured precisely.
For producer durables, the coefficient is relatively small and
positive, but not statistically significant. This positive coefficient is
consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis which predicts that producer29
durables will account for a smaller fraction of the decline in total output
when uncertainty is cause of the downturn than when more ordinary factors
are depressing the economy.
Given these expanded prediction equations, it is useful to see if the
forecast errors present in 1929 and 1930 for consumer durables and
semidurables using the simple prediction equations are still present when
one explicitly takes into account the uncertainty effects of stock market
volatility. The estimated forecast errors for equations (12) and (13) for
four major classes of commodity output are given in Table 4. Table 4 shows
that including the stock variability measure in the prediction equation
eliminates the forecast errors for consumer durables in 1929 and 1930
entirely. For semidurables, including the stock variability measure
actually turns the forecast error in 1929 from negative to positive and
reduces the negative error in 1930 by 50 percent. These results show that
uncertainty effects due to stock market variability can explain most of the
unusual behavior of consumer spending on durable and semjdurable goods in
the first year and a half of the Great Depression.15 At the same time, the
figures in Table 4 show that the expanded prediction equations are much
less successful in eliminating the forecast errors for consumer perishables
and producer durables.
III. DIRECT EVIDENCE OF UNCERTAINTY
In this section I investigate an entirely different type of evidence
concerning the links between the crash of the stock market uncertainty,
and the fall in output in late 1929 and much of 1930. Specifically, I
examine the forecasts and analyses of five contemporary business analysts30
over the 1920s to determine whether uncertainty was uniquely high following
the stock market crash, whether this uncertainty was caused by the crash,
and whether uncertainty was believed to have an important negative effect
on spending.
The particular forecasts that I analyze are those furnished in
Business Week, The Harvard Weekly Letters, The Masazine of Wall Street,
Moody's Investors Service, and Standard Trade and Securities Service.(See
the appendix for a more information on these sources.) These five business
reports are representative of the many such magazines and forecasting
services that provided economic information in the interwar period. These
reports typically included a prediction about the behavior of output over
the coming months and an analysis of the perceived cause of the current
situation.
Because of their dual functions, these reports can provide two types
on information about the presence of temporary uncertainty around the time
of the Great Crash. First, since the forecasters typically provided some
indication of their certainty about their predictions, the reports can show
whether the forecasters themselves became dramatically more uncertain about
the course of economic activity following the collapse of stock prices in
1929 than they did during other periods of upheaval, such as 1920-21. This
kind of information is very helpful if one believes either that forecasters
mirror the expectations of ordinary consumers and producers or that
forecasters play an important role in forming expectations.16 Second, the
analyses of the forecasters may indicate their impression of consumer
expectations and uncertainty. If they do this consistently, then this can
provide direct evidence on whether uncertainty about the course of future
output increased around the time of the Great Crash.31
Forecaster Uncertainty
The information that the forecasts provide about forecaster
uncertainty due to the Great Crash is striking. An analysis of the
confidence expressed by the forecasters shows that forecasters became
uncertain immediately following the Great Crash to an extent that was
unprecedented in the l920s. Furthermore, this uncertainty, while perhaps
resolved somewhat in the spring of 1930, appears to resurface by mid-1930.
j. Among the five forecasters, four become definitely more
uncertain about the future of business immediately following the collapse
of stock prices in late October 1929. This change is particularly
noticeable in The Harvard Weekly Letters (referred to as Harvard in the
following discussion), In early October 1929, Harvard is certain that a
mild downturn is in store for the economy. It states: "business is thus
facing another period of readjustment" (October 19, 1929, p. 252).
Following the crash, however, Harvard becomes very uncertain.It says:
"the unprecedented declines in stock prices ... makeit difficult to
estimate at present the amount of injury which will be done to business"
(November 16, 1929, p.274). Furthermore, Harvard specifically mentions
that it feels that this uncertainty is temporary and that "a month hence it
may be possible to appraise the situation more satisfactorily and present a
definite forecast for the year 1930" (November 16, 1929, p. 276).
This same pattern is also shown in Moody's Investors Service
(Moodv's). In mid-October Moody's states with confidence that "certain
signs of slightly diminished activity ... donot, in our opinion,
foreshadow a real business depression" (October 14, 1929, p. 1-225).
However, by November, Moody's is much more uncertain about the course of32
future activity. It states:"the extent of net paper losses and their
effect can hardly be measured for the country as a whole" (November 18,
1929, p. 1-241) and in December it discusses "the extent of the current
decline, whatever it will ultimately prove" (December 16, 1929, p. 1-257).
Standard Trade and Securities Service (Standard) is somewhat different
from Harvard and Moody's in that it is very optimistic before the crash. It
states in September that "American business ... willmake another
excellent showing in the second half [of 1929]" (September 18, 1929, p. 1).
Following the stock market crash in October, Standard, like Harvard and
Moody's, becomes much less certain of its forecasts. In November it states
that the "full significance of the drastic drop in security values on
future business can in no wise be measured" (November 27, 1929, p. 1).
business Week is also quite positive about the future course of
business and quite certain of its forecasts in the fall of 1929. In early
October it states that "business is not collapsing; it is merely settling
down to a normal pace" (October 5, 1929, p. 3). Following the crash it is
definitely more uncertain of its forecast. In early November business Week
tates that "early in 1930 business is likely to resume its normal stride,
if business men will keep their shirts on and roll up their sleeves"
(November 9, 1929, p. 3).In January it is even more uncertain, stating
"the forecasters cannot yet read the riddle of 1930" (January 8, 1930, p.
48).
In contrast to the other forecasters, The Magazine of Wall Street
(Wa].l Street) appears to be nearly as certain of its forecasts after the
crash as it was before the crash. Wall Street states in September 1929
that "it would require some extraordinary conditions to bring on one of the
old-time depressions" (September 21, 1929, p. 953). In November, it states33
with equal confidence that "the general outlook for trade and industry is
thus one in which moderate restraint may be evidenced for some months, but
recovery to a fair measure of prosperous conditions may be
anticipated before the new year is far advanced" (November 16, 1929, p.
96). Despite the fact that Wall Street does not show a dramatic increase
in uncertainty following the Great Crash, this analysis of forecasts from
around the collapse of stock prices indicates that four of the five
forecasters were noticeably less confident of their forecasts immediately
following the crash than in the months before.
It is important to note that, with the exception of Business Week, all
of the forecasters who become less confident indicate that it is due to the
stock crash. Several of the forecasters stress that the stock market crash
was an exogenous event. There are numerous references to the "gigantic
bubble of speculation in stocks," the fact that "the (stocki market is now
almost wholly 'psychological' ,"and"the pricking of the speculative
bubble."17 Forecasters are uncertain about the effects of this exogenous
event because they see conflicting tendencies. The forecasters are very
aware that in the past drastic movements in stock prices or financial
panics sometimes preceded recessions. More importantly, as will be
discussed later, all of the forecasters believe that the crash will cause
consumer uncertainty which will tend to lower spending and thus depress
output. On the other hand, the forecasters see the fact that business
inventories are not excessive as a favorable sign and have great faith that
the Federal Reserve will lower interest rates and hence encourage
investment. The forecasters appear to be unsure about which of these
conflicting tendencies will predominate.
While the confidence that forecasters expressed in their predictions34
is obviously an important measure of uncertainty, the divergence of
forecasts is another measure. Several authors have noted that most of the
contemporaneous forecasts were fairly positive following the Great Crash,
at least in light of what eventually happened to output over the course of
the Great Depression (see for example, Temin (1976) and Dominguez, Fair,
and Shapiro (1986)). However, it is clear from a reading of several
forecasts that there was more divergence than usual in the point estimates
of the forecasts shortly after the collapse of stock prices.
Evidence that this was the case is provided by the fact that the
forecasters themselves commented on this divergence frequently. Standard
notes that "with the opening of the new year, there is a wide conflict of
opinion as to what is in store for industry and commerce during the early
part of 1930" (January 3, 1930, p.1). Business Week also notes that
"opinions may differ as to whether or not the stock market collapse
.
neednecessarily be followed by a serious business recession!. (November 30,
1929, p. 44). Such divergence of opinion may be important if srie believes
that forecasters do not merely mirror public expectations,butactually
affect them. In this case, consumers and ducers might be made quite
uncertain because they are receiving conflicting predictions from the
economic experts.
i22Q.. While this evidence suggests that forecaster uncertainty
increased following the Great Crash of October 1929, it does not indicate
whether this was a unique event.It could be that forecasters always
become uncertain in downturns. To get a sense of whether the rise in
uncertainty in November 1929 was unique, I examine the forecasts and
analyses of the same forecasters examined above for the periods surrounding
the recessions of 1920-21 and l92324.l8 As with the previousanalysis, I35
examine the forecasts from the several months before any signs of downturn
through the end of the following year.
I find that the dramatic change in forecasters' expressions of
confidence that followed the Great Crash does not occur in either 1921 or
1924. In these earlier downturns there is never a time when several of the
forecasters simultaneously express greater uncertainty. Furthermore,
several of the forecasters are equally confident throughout both 1921 and
1924. For example, Harvard states with surety in February 1924 that
"conditior thus remain favorable to the maintenance of generally good
business conditions" (February 2, 1924, p. 28) and again in May with equal
confidence that "business is not now facing a period of general depression"
(May 17, 1924, p. 134).
In the l920s some of the forecasters do periodically express
uncertainty about their forecasts, but these statements seem to be vague
disclaimers, the essence of which is that forecasting is difficult. For
example, Moody's ends nearly every forecast with a statement such as "the
above interpretation of 1921 developments is, of course, tentative insofar
as details are concerned. But I have full confidence that the general
trend which I have outlined will develop" (January 6, 1921, p. 7).
Similarly, Standard occasionally includes such statements as "the view
itself is to be interpreted as an estimate of the probabilities, rather
than as a cocksure forecast" (November 26, 1923, p. 375).
There does not appear to be any systematic pattern to these
disclaimers, except perhaps that they appear slightly more frequently when
the analyst is forecasting a change in direction rather than the
continuation of current conditions. Furthermore, they occur at radically
different times for different forecasters and are never followed by36
statements about when the forecaster expects to be more certain as they
often are in 1929. Thus, they are at most statements of permanent
uncertainty among the forecasters, not the statements of extreme temporary
uncertainty that are so common following the Great Crash. These
characteristics indicate that the five forecasters did not become uncertain
in these earlier downturns as they did in 1929. This suggests that the
rise in uncertainty in 1929 was an unusual event that could have been an
important source of the unusually large and mysterious drop in spending and
output in the first year of the Great Depression.
121Q.Whileit appears that the rise in uncertainty due to the stock
market crash in late 1929 and early 1930 can explain why output plummeted
immediately following the crash, there remains the question of why the
economy remained depressed and in fact continued to decline through all of
1930. Judging from the five business analyses that I have examined, the
answer may be that uncertainty continued or at least reappeared at various
points in 1930.
In the spring of 1930 most of the forecasters appear to become both
very positive and very certain. For example, Moody's states in April that
"the inescapable conclusion is that we are not facing a business
depression" (April 24, 1930, p. 1-172). Similarly, Harvard, which had said
in November that it could not make a forecast, States in April that "what
this forecast means for second quarter business may now be indicated more
precisely" and forecasts that "by May or June, ... [thereshould be]
definite evidence of a more substantial recovery in business" (April 19,
1930, p. 104).
This apparent certainty may indicate that uncertainty related to the
Great Crash was resolved in the spring of 1930. However, it is possible37
that this confidence should not be taken at face value. Beginning in late
November, Herbert Hoover called a series of conferences of businessmen, the
purpose of which was to "talk up" business. Indeed, Hoover's main response
to the stock market crash and the ensuing decline in real output was to
promulgate optimistic forecasts and to encourage others to do so as well.
It seems very likely that the professional analysts came under pressure to
participate in this "prosperity propaganda program" and hence introduced
into their forecasts a degree of manufactured optimism.
Indirect evidence that this did happen is provided by the analysis of
Standard in the spring of 1930. Standard is openly skeptical of the Hoover
program. It states: "officialdom takes the attitude that its function is
to point out whatever is bright in the picture" and therefore "the business
community cannot look to its political government ... toanalyze business
conditions fairly and impartially" (March 19, 1930, p.3). When Standard
announces in the same issue that "uncertainties in the situation are still
too numerous to permit the formation of an iron-bound opinion as regards
the longer term prospect for industrial production" it seems clear that it
is proud of not taking part in the Hoover boosterism (March 19, 1930, p.1).
In addition to the fact that many of the forecasters may have been
artificially confident in the second quarter of 1930, they are also openly
uncertain and negative by the summer. For example, Moody's seems to be
quite unsure of its current forecast when it states in June that "within
the next two or three months it may be possible to say with more certainty
just how far this improvement will go and whether it will be sustained or
not" (June 27, 1930, p.1-280). Similarly, 8usiness Week, which seemed to
pride itself on positive prognostications in the spring of 1930, States in
June that "the prospects of early return to normal levels are less hopeful"38
(June 11, 1930, p. 1). This suggests that at the very least forecaster
uncertainty rose again in the summer of 1930.
Consumer Uncertainty
As mentioned above, the forecasts of the five business analysts
provide evidence not only of their own expectations but also those of
average consumers. The descriptions that the business analysts provide of
consumer expectations suggest that consumers became uniquely uncertain
immediately following the Great Crash. The forecasters also provide
plausible reasons for believing that consumers remained uncertain
throughout 1930.
1929. Before the crash in 1929, most of the analysts barely mentioned
consumers. Those that did merely stressed that consumption was at record
levels and that retail sales were expected to remain high. For example,
Moody's states in August 1929 that the large purchasing power in the hands
of the people will keep on transmuting itself into effective retail demand
for all kinds of consumption goods" (August 12, 1929, p. 1-174).
After the crash the references to consumer uncertainty are many.
Moody's, for example, argues that the factors which 'may ultimately prove
more important than any calculated estimate of losses in purchasing power
[are] the individual attitude and sentiment of people who have been
affected by the stock market." It States further that "the effect of the
general sentiment may be to slow down business activity" (both quotations
are from Moody's, November 18, 1929, p. 1-242). In December Moody's is
even more explicit about the rise in uncertainty. It discusses "the stock
market break, which undermined general confidence" and indicates that
"during the past few weeks almost everybody held his plans in abeyance and39
waited for the horizon to clear" (December 16, 1929, P. 1-257).
Standard, like Moody's, not only mentions the rise in uncertainty, but
also differentiates its effect on consumer spending from the effect of the
decline in wealth. Several issues of its report in the fall of 1929
contain statements such as: "reflecting the loss of purchasing power, as
well as public confidence, resulting from the collapse of security values,
we anticipate a sizable decline in internal business during early future
months" (November 20, 1929, p. 1). The Harvard Weekly Letters, while not
discussing consumer uncertainty directly, notes that "coinciding with the
break in stock prices, department store trade showed a pronounced
shrinkage" (November 30, 1929, p. 284) and refers to "a spirit of caution
widely prevalent" (December 21, 1929, p. 308).
Business Week and even The Mazazine of Wall Street, which does not
become obviously more uncertain of its own forecast, also believe that
consumers became very uncertain following the itock market crash. In early
November, Business Week refers to "the hysteria that accompanied the market
upheaval" and the resulting "suspicious and nervous public' (November 2,
1929, p. 3). Similarly, Wall Street states that "in itself, a severe
reaction in stock prices has an unfavorable influence on general trade both
by curtailing purchasing power and by impairing the confidence of consumers
and business men alike." It also notes that as a result of his
uncertainty, "there has been a tendency to reduce or postpone projected
commitments" (both quotations are from Wall Street, November 16, 1929, p.
94).
All of the forecasters clearly feel that consumers, and to some degree
businessmen, became more uncertain about future income as a direct result
of the collapse of stock market prices. The forecasters are also quite40
explicit about the effect of this rise in uncertainty. They are all
certain that it will retard consumer spending on "furs, jewelry,
automobiles, radios, furniture, and anything else that may be classified
under the title of unessential" (Standard, November 20, 1929, p. 4).
12Q. The emphasis on consumer uncertainty following the Great Crash
is particularly remarkable given that consumers are rarely mentioned during
other periods in the 1920s. In the downturn of 1923-24, most references to
consumers stress that consumption is doing well. For example, Standard
states in November 1923 that "still consumption holds its even pace"
(November 26, 1923, p. 376) and stresses in April 1924 that "high
consumption" is a favorable indicator (April 28, 1924, p. 136). Similarly,
Harvard states in the summer of 1924 that "retail trade, during the first
half of the year, compared favorably with the corresponding period of last
year" (July 19, 1924, p. 202).
As the downturn deepens in the second quarter of 1924, there is some
mention of a drop in consumption. However, the source of this drop is
attributed to a drop in purchasing power due to rising unemployment. For
example, Moody's states in June 1924 that 'the growing unemployment,
although still moderate, naturally involves a diminution of the public
purchasing power, and this diminution is plainly reflected in the sales of
retail stores" (June 12, 1924, p. 241). This is very different from the
discussion in 1929 where the analysts specifically differentiate between
the effect on consumption of the decline in wealth and the rise in
unemployment and the effect on consumption of the rise in uncertainty.
In 1920-21 there is some discussion of a drop in consumption but it
is much less widespread than in 1929. A few analysts feel that consumer
spending is being reduced because of expectations of deflation. For41
example, Standard states in the fall of 1920: "the public is displaying
caution in its purchases owing to the general expectation that prices will
go lower" (October 11, 1920, p. 59). However, the possibility that
consumers are feeling uncertain about future income is not mentioned at
all. Thus, the qualitative evidence on consumer expectations suggests that
the rise in uncertainty in November 1929 was uniquely large and therefore
could have had a uniquely strong negative effect on consumer spending.
Q. The descriptions that the business analysts give of consumer
and business expectations also suggest that the unusual level of
uncertainty in late 1929 continued and perhaps increased through 1930. Th
Harvard Weekly Letters, for example, states in May that "the latest break
in stock prices, both because of the fresh losses entailed and the effect
on business sentiment, is an influence temporarily retarding business
improvement" (May 17, 1930, p. 128). In June Harvard again states that
"current business sentiment is apprehensive" and lists as the reasons for
this:
(1) "belated realization that ...theWashington business
conferences must be slow in yielding tangible effects"
(2) "prolonged suspense concerning the tariff revision"
(3) "alarm about the continuing weakness in prominent commodity
markets"
(4) "fear of further liquidation in the stock market"
(5) "concern lest the current easy-money policy of the federal
reserve system and of foreign central banks may prove short-
lived" (June 21, 1930, p. 154).
Moody's also discusses uncertainty in 1930 and stresses the causal
role of political factors.In May it speaks of "the widening dissension
within the party in power ... [which)will create even more uncertainty
and hesitation in the minds of business men" (May 22, 1930, p. 1-229). In42
the discussion of consumers, Moody's says that "the recent conservatism in
buying [is] caused by lower purchasing power and accentuated by
psychological uncertainties" (July 24, 1930, P. 1-303, 304).
Standard and Business Week also both see a great deal of uncertainty
among producers and consumers during all of 1930. Standard speaks of "this
particular time of persistent uncertainty throughout the country" (April
23, 1930, p. 2) and Business Week states that "there is a widespread and
disquieting uncertainty as to how far this recovery will go and how long it
will be before normal level of activity will again be approached" (February
22, 1930, back cover). Business Week believes that this uncertainty is
partly due to "the drastic worldwide deflation of commodity prices"
(February 22, 1930, back cover) and partly due to "conflict and chaos in
Washington" which has led to "business hesitation in long-time commitments"
(May 14, 1930, p. 1).
Both of these analysts also believe that businessmen and consumers are
particularly hesitant in 1930 because over-optimistic forecasts lad them to
expect recovery too soon. Standard, for example, states that
"readjuscments ...werepostponed in the hope that they would not be
necessary" (October 22, 1930, p. 2). Business Week suggests that "business
is now suffering chiefly from a pain in the expectations, due mainly to
overproduction of official forecasts of early and easy return of the swell
times of yesteryear" (May 14, 1930, p. 1). In this way, it seems quite
possible that Hoover's prosperity propaganda program could have contributed
to the uncertainty of consumers and producers in 1930 because it led to
forecasts that were so at odds with actual economic conditions. As a
result, people may have decided to delay spending as they waited for
further information that would either effectively support or contradict the43
official and professional forecasts about the course of income in thenear
future.
Several of forecasters Stress the importance of deliberationsover and
the eventual passing of the Hawley-Smoot tariff incausing uncertainty both
before the Great Crash, and especially in 1930. Forexample, in June 1930,
Wall Street refers to the fact that "uncertainty...[hasjbeen the new
order of the day' (June 14, 1930, p. 254) andsuggests that the "suspense
and indecision created by the final outcome of the new rates includedin
the Hawley-Smoor tariff bill' has been an important cause of this
uncertainty (June 14, 1930, p. 289). Business Week reports in June 1930
that business is experiencing "anxiety over effects of thenew tariff" and
argues that the "flexibility [provisions of the tariffj mean chronic
uncertainty" (June 25, 1930, p. 1 and p. 48, respectively).
This evidence indicates that the five business analysts all view
consumers and investors as remaining uncertain and perhaps becomingmore
uncertain throughout much of 1930. However, whereas theanalysts all
agreed that the stock market crash was the primary source ofuncertainty in
late 1929 and early 1930, they see more variedsources in the second,
third, and fourth quarters of 1930. Continued declines in securities
prices is certainly a major source, but commodity price falls, tariff
legislation, and excessive government optimism are also seen asimportant
factors generating uncertainty among consumers andproducers in mid and
late 1930.
The continuation of uncertainty in 1930 may explain whyconsumption
did not rebound after its precipitous decline immediatelyfollowing the
Great Crash. Because consumers remained uncertain, they found it
advantageous to continue to postpone purchases of durable goods. The44
possible increase in uncertainty in 1930 may also explainwhy the downturn
became more severe. In the context of the simple modelof Section I, if
uncertainty genuinely increased then this could havecaused the downturn to
accelerate. In this way, the qualitative evidence suggeststhat
uncertainty can explain not only the initial collapseof output in late
1929, but also the continued drop in consumption throughout1930.
CONCLUSION ANDIMPLICATIONSFOR 1987-8
This analysis has investigated a possible link between the stock
market crash of October 1929 and the rapid acceleration of realeconomic
decline in late 1929 and all of 1930. The paper has used theoretical
arguments, empirical results, and qualitative evidence onexpectations to
suggest that the stock market crash temporarilyincreased uncertainty about
the course of future income and that the result of this temporary
uncertainty was that consumers, and to a lesser degree investors, cut
spending on durable goods drastically as they waited for the uncertainty
to
be resolved. This story can provide an explanation for some important
puzzles that have previously prevented a complete explanation ofthe Great
Depression. Namely, it can explain why consumption spending dropped
precipitously in late 1929 and early 1930 despite the fact that such
spending is typically a stable function of income, and why investment
spending also declined substantially despite the fact that monetary policy
appears to have been quite loose.
Given that this paper finds a link between the Great Crash and the
onset of the Great Depression, it is natural to wonder whether these
results provide insight into the behavior of the economy following the45
October 1987 collapse of stock prices. Before answering this question, it
is important to point out that there is no reason to presume that a stock
crash today will have the same effects that it did 50 years ago. In
general, the changes in the structure of the economy and the role of the
government that have occurred since the New Deal make it possible that any
given shock will have a different effect today than it did in 1929. This
is especially true in the case of a stock market crash. In 1929 the
collapse of stock prices had large real effects because it generated
tremendous uncertainty about future income. If the government today is
perceived as a ready stabilizer or if the level of economic understanding
has increase substantially over time, then it is possible that a modern
stock crash will not generate the uncertainty that it once did.
Despite these caveats, it is possible to find some evidence that
forces similar to those present in 1929 were working in the months
immediately following the stock market crash of 1987. Between the third
and fourth quarters of 1987, real consumption spending declined nearly 1
percent. This is the largest one quarter drop in consumption since the
recession of 1980, and is large even in comparison to the drops related to
the oil price shocks of the mid-l970s. More importantly, this drop appears
to be unrelated to the movements in income that one would normally expect
to determine consumption spending. Thus, it is possible that consumers
responded to the recent stock market crash by cutting back on their
spending on durable and semidurable goods in the same way that they did in
1929.
Following the dramatic one quarter decline, consumption recovered and
began to grow at a normal rate. This is obviously different from the first
year of the Great Depression when real consumer spendingcontinued to fall46
throughout 1930, with only brief periods of respite. However, the
experience of 1930 may provide insight into why the economy appears to have
recovered so quickly in 1988. In 1930, the uncertainty generated by the
October stock crash was not resolved quickly. Rather, as the analysis of
the contemporary forecasts in Section III revealed, the uncertainty
continued and probably increased during 1930 because of further drastic
stock price declines, the collapse of commodity prices, and misguided
government policies. As a result of this continued and intensified
uncertainty, consumption remained depressed throughout 1930.
In 1988, it is possible that the uncertainty generated by the October
1987 crash was resolved quickly. Since October, stock price movements have
been more moderate than they were in late 1929 and early 1930 and the
economic news has in general been much more positive. As a result,
consumers may have regained their confidence and started spending in 1988
in a way that they did not in 1930. If this true, then this analysis may
suggests that it is simple good fortune that has prevented the most recent
stock market crash from plunging the U.S. into an economic downturn.APPENDIX
Sources of Prewar Economic Forecasts
Business Week
1929-30: Business Week. The forecasts appear in the section entitled
"Business Outlook."
1920-24: The magazine did not begin until August 1929.
Harvard
1929-30: Harvard Economic Society. Weekly Letters. Most of the forecasts
are found in the letter entitled "Business and Financial
Conditions: The Business Outlook" which appeared once a month.
1923-24: Harvard Economic Service. Weekly Letters. The forecasts are
found in the letter entitled "General Business Conditions."
1920-21: The material which later appears in the Weekly Letters is
contained in these years in The Review of Economic Statistics.
The relevant sections are entitled "General Business Conditions"
and 'Review of the First (Second, etc.) Quarter of the Year."
All years: Moody's Investors Service. Moody's Investors Service. The
forecasts typically appear in the issue entitled "Monthly
Analysis of Business Conditions."
Standard
1929-30: Standard Statistics Company, Inc. Standard Trade and Securities
Service. The forecasts appear in the monthly issue entitled "The
Business Prospect."
1920-24: Standard Statistics Company, Inc. Standard Daily Trade Service.
The forecasts usually appear in the supplement entitled "The
Business Prospect."
Wall Street
All years: The Magazine of Wall Street. The forecasts appear periodically
in articles with varying titles.ENDNOTES
1. In the case that the durable good is a car V0 can be thought of as the
utility value of a very old car or the utility that the consumer receives
from walking to work or being free of having to maintain a car.I assume
that V0 is small enough that under certainty one will always choose to
replace the durable after it is fully depreciated (i.e. after N periods).
2. There is a market for durable goods even in a downturn because a
fraction of the stock of durables is depreciating completely in any period.
3. This argument assumes that there is no change in the relative price of
new and used durable goods over the cycle. It also does not apply to goods
at the extremes of the quality spectrum.
4. Among the factors that might affect whether or not a resale market
develops are ease of determining the quality of a used good and the
installation or transportation Costs associated with the good.
5. See, for example, Galbraith (1955), Chandler (1970), and the
contemporary forecasters whose views are discussed in Section III of this
paper.
6. Both of these stories provide a partial equilibrium explanation of why
a stock crash could generate temporary uncertainty. Neither of them takes
into account the fact that if people knew the model given above, they
should have known that if they became uncertain following the crash, they
would cut their consumption and hence cause a decline in output for sure.
As a result, if they were completely rational, they should have been
pessimistic following the crash, not merely uncertain. The neglect of this
possibility rests on the assumption that consumers and producers do not
know the true model of the economy. While this assumption is perhaps
unconventional, it appears quite realistic, particularly for the pre-Worid
War II period.
7. The exact timing of this fall in sales is actually somewhat uncertain.
Most likely, if uncertainty related to the stock crash were the crucial
determinant of the drop in sales, the drop should occur very soon after
late October 1929. However, Bernanke (l983a) argues that the drop in
spending may not occur immediately if an event must persist for a while
before it generates uncertainty.
8. See Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1944, p. 543 for a discussion of the
relationship between department store sales and total retail sales.
9. For mail-order sales, but not for any other series on spending on
consumer durables, there is also a substantial residual in September 1929.
Because mail-order houses sell mainly to agricultural areas, this drop in
September may reflect conditions in the agricultural sector in the fall of
1929.
10. The fact that the forecast errors for both series are slightly
negative in November is somewhat at odds with the model given in Section I
which predicts that the spending on nondurables should actually have risen
in response to temporary uncertainty. This finding could be due to thefact that the sales series may be driven by industry specific effects or by
the fact that income and wealth both fell somewhat in late 1929.
11. For an evaluation of the Shaw series, see Romer (forthcoming).
12. In this estimation the years corresponding to the direct U.S.
involvement in World War I, 1917 and 1918, are excluded.
13. This claim assumes that the behavior of inventories of particular
types of goods mimics that of total inventories. While postwar evidence
suggests that this is a reasonable assumption, it is possible that
inventories of particular goods could have fallen, despite the rise in
total inventories.
14. It is useful to emphasize that because current total commodity output
is included as an explanatory variable in these regressions, the fact that
durables always decline substantially in a depression is accounted for. As
a result, the forecast errors in other major downturns such as 1893, 1908,
and 1921 are typically not large or of a particular sign.
15. As the discussion of previous research in the introduction would
suggest, simple wealth effects due to the decline in stock values cannot
explain much of the unusual behavior of consumer durables and seinidurables
in 1929 and 1930. If one replaces v in equation (13) with the simple
percentage change in the level of the stock market over the year, the
forecast errors remain large. For consumer durables the forecast errors
are -.062in 1929 and -.003in 1930. For consumer semidurable the forecast
errors are -.024 in 1929 and -.042in 1930.
16. Crainlich (1983) suggests that in some situations the forecasts of
professional forecasters provide a reasonably good proxy for consumer
expectations.
17. These quotations come from Moody's, January 6, 1930, p. W-5; Business
September7, 1929, p. 3; and The Maaazjne of Wall Street, June 14,
1930, p. 254, respectively.
18. Only these two recessions were analyzed because most of the forecasts
do not begin until shortly before World War I. No forecasts are analyzed
for Business Week for these earlier cycles because the magazine only came
into existence in August 1929.REFERENCES
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Behavior of Real Monthly Spending
Forecast Errorsof the Prediction Equation forthe
PercentageChange in Real MonthlySpending
(Equation 11)
Series SEE Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929 1929
Department
Store Sales .035 .093 -.026 -.064 .027 -.098 -.034 -.042
Mail-order
Sales .087 -.114 -.098 -.098 .084 •.252 -.155 -.179
Automobile
Registrations .092 .029 -.149 -.137 -.052 -.132 .096 -.170
Residential
Construction




Contracts .155 -.156 -.038 .031 .028 -.519 .137 .027
Ten- cent
Store Sales .038 -.077 -.059 -.010 -.043 -.035 .010 -.060
Grocery
Store Sales .035 -.068 .017 -.019 .02]. NA NA NATable 1, continued
Sources: The Department Store sales series is from the Federal Reserve
8ulletin, June 1944, p. 549. I use the version of the FRZ index that
covers the entire United States.
The series on Mail-Order sales is from the Survey of Current
Business, 1932 Annual Supplement, pp. 50-51, and various earlier issues.
The series on new car registrations for 1925-1929 is from Standard
Statistics Co. ,StandardStatistical Bulletin, 1930-31 Base Book, March
1930, p. 182. The data for 1930 are from various issues of the Automobile
Trade Journal and Motor Ace.
The residential construction contracts series is series A8 from
Lipsey and Preston, 1966, p. 73. The commercial and industrial contracts
series is the sum of series A17 and Al9 from Lipsey and Preston, 1966, pp.
95-96 and 100-101.
The series on Ten-Cent Store sales is from the Standard Statistical
Bulletin, 1932 Base Book, January 1932, p. 174.
The series on Grocery Store sales is from the Federal Reserve
Bulletin, April 1928, pp. 234-235, and later monthly issues of the
Bulletin.
Notes: For all series I use the version that is not adjusted for seasonal
variation. The series for Department Store sales Mail-Order sales, and
Ten-Cent Store sales are deflated by the Consumer Price Index for all
goods, (CPI-W, 1957-59—100). The series for Grocery Store sales is
deflated by the Consumer Price Index for food (CPI-W 1969—100). Both
these price series are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Historical.
SummarY from Detailed Monthly CPI Reoorts, microfiche, 1987.TABLE 2
Behaviorof Reel Commodity Output
ForecastErrors of the
PredictionEquation for the
Percentage Change in Commodity
Output(Equation 12)
CommodityOutput
byMinorGroup SEE 1929 1930
Consumer Perishables
Manufactured Food .050 -.018 .051
Nonmanufactured Food .068 -.058 -.023
Tobacco Products .053 .033 -.043
Drugs and Toiletries .065 .028 .037
Magazines and Newspapers .109 -.032 .033
Manufactured Fuels .094 .065 .007
Nonmanufactured Fuels .128 -.038 -.146
Total .035 .OO8 .020
Consumer Semidurables
Dry Goods and Notions .075 .028 -.044
Clothing .069 .005 -.053
Shoes and Boots .059 -.003 -.075
House Furnishings .069 -.011 -.001
Tires and Tubes .247 -.291 .101
Total .043 -.035 -.070
Consumer Durables
Household Furniture .077 -.082 -.102
Stoves and Furnaces .158 .037 .053
Floor Coverings .065 .017 -.238
China and Utensils .122 -.038 -.110
Musical Instruments .117 -.281 .320
Jewelry and Silverware .194 -.041 -.208
Luggage .075 -.008 -.169
Motor Vehicles .240 -.268 -.327
Motor Vehicle Accessories .247 -.227 .094
Pleasure Craft .165 .327 .420






by MinorGroup SEE 1929 1930
Producer Durables
.158 .140 .226 Industrial Machinery
Tractors .761 .025 - .137
Electrical Equipment .159 .008 .047
Farm Equipment .166 .025 .119
Office and Store Machinery .164 - .103 .113
Office and Store Fixtures .095 .121 -.177
Locomotives .243 .113 .707
Ships and Boats .261 .315 .505
Business Motor Vehicles .323 .209 -.269
Carpenter's Tools .136 - .081 .129
Miscellaneous Equipment .133 .144 .041
Total .103 .175
Sources: The commodity output series is from Shaw, 1947, Table 1-3, pp.
70-77. The series represents commodity output destined for domestic
consumption, valued in 1913 dollars.
Shaw'sTable 1-3 groups some very minor commodities into a residual
category for each major group. These residual groups are not analyzed
separately here, but are included in the group totals. The sample period
used for estimation is 1889-1916 and 1921-1928. The series for tires and
tubes, stoves and furnaces, luggage, motor vehicles, motor vehicle
accessories, tractors, and business vehicles do not exist for the entire
period 1889-1930. As a result, the starting date for these regressions
must be later than 1889.TABLE 3
Coefficient Estimates for Equation 13





2R a 12 6i
Total Consumer .61 .02 - .50 .42 .14 17.00
Perishables (.01) (.14) (.10) (.11) (9.03)
Total Consumer .62 .06 - .12 .55 - .37 -11.72
Semidurables (.02) (.16) (.14) (.18) (12.04)
Total Consumer .78 - .02 - .13 2.01 .05 -8.99
Durables (.03) (.21) (.23) (.51) (22.67)
Total Producer .76 - .13 -.42 2.41 1.96 3.69
Durables (.04) (.15) (.31) (.45) (28.58)
g.g: Standard errors are in parentheses. All real variables are
expressed as the first differences of logarithms (i.e. as decimals on the
order of .05). A typical value of v is .001; v is equal to .009 in 1929
and .005 in 1930. The sample period used for eshmation is 1889-1913 and
1921-1928. 1917 and 1918 are excluded because they are war years: 1914 and
1915 are excluded because it is impossible to calculate v for 1914 because
the stock market was closed for 4 months.TABLE 4







Simple Regression (Eqn. 12)
-.013 .013
With Stock Market Variability (Eqn. 13) -.154 -.046
Total Consumer Semjdurables
Simple Regression (Eqn. 12) -.038 -.082
With Stock Market Variability (Eqn. 13) .060 -.041
Total Consumer Durables
Simple Regression (Eqn. 12) -.068 -.022
With Stock Market Variability (Eqn. 13) .008 .008
Total Producer Durables
Simple Regression (Eqn. 12) .186 .222
With Stock Market Variability (Eqn. 13) .156 .210
Sources: The commodity output series is from Shaw, 1947, Table 1-3, pp.
70-77. The stock market index is from Cowles, 1939, Table P-l, pp. 66-67.
The stock market volatility measure is calculated as the average of
re monthly squared stock price changes over the calendar year. The
results for the simple regression in Table 4 differ slightly from those in
Table 2 because the sample period of the regressions underlying Table 4
excludes the years 1914-1916.